famous merchants of seventeenth-century Makassar. 10 The first official settlement of the Malays in Makassar had been established in 1561, when the Malay skipper Anakoda Bonang (Datuk Maharaja Bonang) brought gifts of textiles and weapons to the ruler of Goa, Karaeng Tunipalangga. In exchange the Malays were granted land on which to settle and limited self-government. The Karaeng asked only who was to be included among the Malays. Anakoda Bonang replied that the term Malay covered all those who wore a sarong sash, such as men from Pahang, Patani, Champa, Minangkabau and Johor.
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Datuk Maharaja Bonang's chief line of descent could be traced back to a Sayid (descendant of the Prophet) from Mekka, whose lineage ran down through the Malay centres of Aceh, Johor, Singapore and Patani, to a Wan Umar, who married a princess from Banjarmasin. Their descendants spread to Sumbawa, Bima and throughout South Sulawesi. According to tradition it was also Datuk ri Bonang who invited a Minangkabau ulama to Makassar, who was responsible for the court's Islamisation. 12 This must have enormously strengthened the prestige and influence of the Malays.
The Malays' position was further consolidated with the arrival in 1632 of a nobleman from Patani, Datuk Maharaja Lela; he was chosen as chief of the Makassar Malays. 13 By the midseventeenth century Malays were prominent in the life of the court. Ince Amin, a 'Malay of Makassarese descent' , was secretary to the ruler of Goa, and wrote a rhymed chronicle of the war between Goa and the VOC. This Sya'ir Perang Mengkasar gives many examples of the diplomatic and military activities of the Makassar Malays, and confirms VOC accounts of their mediating role. The Sya'ir also reveals Ince Amin's familiarity with Islamic mysticism and Malay literature. As his editor Skinner observes, as royal secretary -a kind of resident intellectual -Ince Amin would have been expected to contribute to court culture.
14 In his Sya'ir Ince Amin celebrates the heroism of Datuk Maharaja Lela, as the Malays' political and military leader. The Datuk's descendants were to dominate the community for over 200 years, or, to adopt a slightly different perspective, those who later rose to power sought legitimation by establishing their connections to his lineage. 'De Kapitein Melajoe'; KKIKM, Sejarah; Cummings, 'Melaka Malay Diaspora'; while Datuk Maharaja Lela is described as coming from Patani, it is worth noting that the Dutch Admiral Speelman, who knew him personally, described Ince Muda, a Minangkabau, as 'coming from the same village as Radja Lella' (Speelman 'Notitie' , Aanwinsten eerste Afdeling, ARA, 1928, nrs.10 and 11, f. 744). This is a manuscript copy of the encyclopaedic memorandum submitted to the VOC by Admiral Cornelis Speelman after the conquest of Goa; see Noorduyn,'Handelsrelaties' for more details. Ince Amin's account of the important role of the Malays in battle is substantiated by other sources. Speelman himself told Batavia that dislodging the Malays with their firearms was a prerequisite for victory, remarking that they 'were even more virulent enemies of the Company than the Makassar people themselves' . 16 Leonard Andaya also notes the commitment and courage of the Malays fighting for Goa. 17 Malay ties with the implacably anti-Dutch chancellor of Goa, Karaeng Karunrung, and other royal clans such as that of Soppeng, also strengthened their opposition. Speelman described the Soppeng king as a 'bitter Mohammedan very close to the Malays' , whose Malay wife 'with all her retinue, at least a hundred strong, and piles of baggage' took refuge from the fighting in the mosque within Goa's fort. 18 Among those prominent Malays who later refused to return to a Dutch-ruled Makassar after the defeat of Goa were the Johorese Ince Jabar, who was married to a Malay ex-wife of the Soppeng ruler, and Ince Amar, a Makassar-born Malay of Minangkabau descent, who was a close relative of the Malay wife of Kaicili' Kalimata, one of the main Makassarese war leaders. 19 No doubt there were many more. Once defeat was inevitable, the Malays scattered throughout the straits between Kalimantan and Sulawesi, to Mandar and Pasir, to Nusa Tenggara, 20 and also to more local havens such as the forest near Maros and islands such as Masalambo and Sabutung. 21 After the Treaty of Bungaya had been signed, another wave of South Sulawesians and Malays fled, to continue their careers elsewhere. For the Malays, this meant commerce; for the Buginese, it often meant politics and war. 22 A weak and humiliated Goa ruler remained in South Sulawesi. The victorious Arung Palakka established his court at Bontoalaq, the ancestral home of the Makassarese leaders, to the east of the now VOC-dominated port settlement. 23 The Dutch priority was to restore some normality to the town, and Speelman inventoried the remaining inhabitants, assessing the various communities' potential contribution to rebuilding. His list included the Malays in Makassar, some thirty-three men. The largest group, eleven, came from West Sumatra, six being identified generally as Minangkabau and five others specifically as coming from Pariaman. The second most numerous category comprised nine Makassar-born men. For five of these descent was still considered relevant, as three were described as being of Johor lineage, and two as descendants of Minangkabau. Four other Malays came from Johor itself, and three from Kalimantan; the rest were individuals from South Sulawesi, Java and Sumbawa. As a group, the Malays exceeded the Chinese, but were far less numerous than the 'Moors' , or Indian Muslims. 24 We can not assume that this remaining group was in any way typical of the pre-conquest period. Although Speelman characterised some of those who had remained in Makassar as having been relatively neutral during the war, others, despite their role in the fighting, had nonetheless Speelman and his successor, Jan van Oppijnen, reported to Batavia that there was little trade in Makassar immediately after the conquest, because of the destruction of the Makassarese and the expulsion of 'that untrustworthy Malay rabble' . 25 The majority of Malays were poor, earning their living as sailors, and only about eight were regarded by Speelman as being of any consequence. However, this handful of significant traders constituted an economic factor of real importance. Anti-Dutch or not, the Malays were needed, and so Speelman invited the refugees to return. His overtures were not always successful. He identified a group of 'hostile creatures, mostly devotees of Karunrung' , and listed the most prominent. Heading them all was Datuk Maharaja Lela himself, 'upper chief of the whole nation' . Earlier, in between the two major campaigns necessary to defeat the Makassarese, Speelman had tried to co-opt Datuk Maharaja Lela. He wrote, 'I in person have sought out Radja Lella in the English lodge twice, thrice, more often, wanting to talk to him' , pointing out the needs and benefits of stabilising trade-to no avail. The Malay leader, a 'hulubalang yang betul' 26 or 'true warrior' , followed Karaeng Karunrung's advice and fled to avoid the repercussions of the fall of Goa. He died at Balanipa in Mandar. Another notable Malay who turned his back on Makassar was Ince Assam. This most prominent trader of the pre-war period had retired to Jepara, where he was said to be old and sick, and indifferent to Speelman's invitation. 27 Other Malays took advantage of the Dutch welcome and returned in 1670, with -the Malay account is careful to stress -the agreement of the ruler of Goa. Some Buginese who had fought alongside the Makassarese also returned, notably the skilled traders from Wajo' , whose communal history paralleled that of the Malays in many ways.
Conquest and trade

It was Datuk
28 Some Malays also saw real possibilities in the 32 In the same year Sri Lela Wangsa was also noted, this time buying up rattan in Pasir.
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But already a new regime was being established. The Dutch deployed both diplomacy and force to control Malay trade. Individual Malay communities such as that in Makassar were subjected to increasing restriction, as wider networks came under pressure and as local VOC authorities imposed regional limitations. Some requests to the Company in Makassar were granted on strict conditions, as when Makassarese Malays sought permission to trade in Banjarmasin, while others were refused, as in the case of the Mandar-based Minangkabau 'pirate' Datuk Jelany. 34 Definitions of piracy and smuggling were of course very subjective: a Malay trader going about his traditional business might find himself labelled 'the well-known smuggler Ince Kasim' and have his ship and cargo seized. 35 By about 1706 trade between Makassar and Johor was greatly reduced, and by 1709 commercial links had been broken because of the turmoil in the Johor sultanate, where 'Bugis' adventurers exacerbated internal crises. 36 The Makassar Malays' trade suffered, and they petitioned the VOC to allow them to sail to Jambi, Palembang and even Melaka. But this was forbidden.
37 Cut off from their traditional wide-ranging networks, denied access to commodities and markets west 
Society and settlement
The focus of power in post-conquest Makassar was Fort Rotterdam, built upon the remnants of Goa's northern fort of Ujung Pandang. Just north of the castle was the new, palisaded settlement of Vlaardingen, where the growing community of 'Europeans' (mestizos and burghers, non-Company personnel) lived, as did many Chinese and other Asians. Still further north, along the beach and, later, south of the fort, new mixed and 'native' settlements proliferated. At first the Malays lived dispersed among the rest of the population: in Vlaardingen, along the coast to the north and east of Fort Rotterdam, and up as far as Ujungtana, close to Tallo' . This was a time of disorder, as the victorious Bugis asserted themselves through violence and plundering. The Malay leaders complained that their rights, as established in 1561, were being ignored. They were then given permission by the Company (and, contemporary tradition makes clear, by the Raja Goa) to clear secondary forest from the land just north of Vlaardingen. 41 This new settlement of Kampung Melayu was to be the focus of Makassar's Malay life for some 300 years, while its physical location between mestizo European, Chinese and Bugis quarters epitomised the role of the community in both trade and politics.
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In the oldest surviving census for the Dutch enclave of Vlaardingen, from 1676, Malays are not distinguished as a category, which suggests that they lived outside the stockade. 42 Chinese, Mardijkers (Christian ex-slaves) and Moors (Indian Muslims) were allowed inside, but the recently defeated Makassarese, like the Malays, were in principle excluded. The Buginese had their own settlements: Arung Palakka's court at Bontoalaq, east of the Fort, and a growing Kampung Bugis about half an hour's walk north of the Dutch castle, past the Kampung Melayu. However, as subjects of native rulers, the Bugis were not counted.
The Malays first appear in the 1680 Vlaardingen census, as a small group of eighteen comprising four men, nine women and five children, all living between the beach and the Chinese street. Other groups were much more numerous. There were ninety-seven Mardijkers and eightyseven Chinese, and even the twenty Moors and Javanese outnumbered the Malays. The total population of the enclosed settlement was 1,135. 43 As usual, the census did not cover VOC employees, and women, children and slaves were all subsumed into the same category as the heads of households. The inhabitants of unregulated settlements beyond the walls were not counted in 1680.
The census for 1685 was more complete. For the first time communities outside Vlaardingen are listed, the kampung quarters or informal semi-rural clusters of compounds, often named after ethnic groups. 44 The free Malay community of 279 showed a balanced demographic picture: 103 men, 110 women and 66 children. They owned 209 slaves, and controlled 23 debtors, so their number was reckoned at 511. 45 The Malays tended to own, per head, more slaves than the indigenous East Indonesian groups, but fewer than the Chinese or the Mardijkers, and nothing near the concentrations held by the Moors or Europeans. Nonetheless, the members of Malay households in 1685 outnumbered those of all other groups, except the Chinese. The total population of Makassar (excluding Company personnel) had grown to 2,751.
Twelve years later, in 1697, the non-VOC population had grown to 3,238. If in 1685 Malays (counting slaves) had formed about 19 per cent of the population, by 1697 the 764 Malays comprised roughly 24 per cent of the whole. 'Mardijker' no longer existed as a category, but 'Moors and Kodjas' had increased to 531. 46 No breakdown is available by age, sex or place of residence. Malays had become the most numerous group in the city. However, by 1722 they were again surpassed by the Chinese (917), and by the non-VOC inhabitants of European status, the burghers (899), although with their 881 they far outstripped the 371 Indians. 47 In subsequent population counts all non-Europeans were subsumed in one category. By 1770 the 'native' population 41 One Kampung ethnic names do not necessarily mean that all or even most inhabitants came from a given group. While this was often the case initially, populations soon shifted and blended; in other cases a kampung housed few people from the eponymous area. Kampung Butung, for example, was very much a mixed settlement; the name may have been derived from its proximity to a landing place for boats from that island, rather than any settlement by Butonese. Fires were one of the most devastating events in Makassar's urban life, and descriptions give us some insight into settlement patterns. In 1679 a great fire, fanned by a strong sea wind, destroyed eighty houses in Vlaardingen, including the living quarters of two Moor-Malays, Ince Buang and Ince Tengah, sons of the famous merchant, Mapulle. Their compound consisted of four large houses, and assorted small dwellings where their people lived. 48 The many slaves and debtbondsmen were expected to earn their own living; some occupations -cooking coconut oil, baking sweets for sale in the market -were high fire-risk activities. After the Vlaardingen compound was burnt out, this 'great rabble' moved into the Moorish quarter between the beach and the Kampung Bugis. Here, in August 1680, their enterprises triggered a new fire which destroyed 150 houses, including their whole compound, much of the Wajorese area and part of the kampung for Moors and Bugis. 49 Over a hundred years later, on 6 August 1791, another fire swept through the Kampung Melayu, destroying it completely. The Dutch authorities saw this as an opportunity to improve town security, and contemplated resettling all Malays in Kampung Baru, south of the castle. This would involve the removal of 38 'kampung' (used here in the sense of compounds belonging to individual extended families), of which just more than half were actually Malay-owned. 50 It was reckoned that these thirty-eight compounds comprised at least 300 houses, and accommodated 2,300 or 2,400 people.
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Since the total non-European population of Makassar in that year (1791) was 4,934, 52 about half the town would have had to be re-housed. The densely settled Chinese street was not involved in this plan, nor were the more peripheral kampung. It is, therefore, likely that a very high proportion of the 'Malay' population lived in the twenty Malay-owned compounds considered for removal. Since they probably varied in size from poor clusters of a few huts to large complexes, it is not possible to be precise, but many compounds could have consisted of more than ten houses, with dozens of inhabitants. If this was so, then it illustrates probable patterns of dependency, with dominant patrons sheltering many clients. However, the ethnic mix of compound ownership (not to mention their undoubtedly even more heterogeneous inhabitants) warns us against any assumed congruence between formal classification and social reality. The relocation plan was submitted to the VOC High Government in Batavia, which rejected it as impossible, given the scale of resettlement required. 53 The Dutch regarded the integration of the Malays and Chinese into town life as important, for both economic and security reasons. In 1728, for example, Governor Gobius noted that the Malays could muster 265 armed men, capable of turning out in 'good order, under the command of their Captain and lesser officers' . This Malay contingent was an effective armed force, outnumbering the combined manpower of the 70 burghers, the 60 Chinese (including peranakan) and 60 Mardijkers.
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Half a century earlier Ince Amin and Speelman had both noted the important role of Goa's wellarmed and cohesive Malay company. 55 The Malay kampung itself was also seen as a reliable barrier between the volatile Bugis settlement and the castle.
Authority and identity
The VOC always worked together with local leaders, giving them military titles, symbols of power and privileges in exchange for their cooperation in governing the various communities. 59 The Company allowed him an income from the fish market he built, and from fees derived from registering his subjects' property. These Kapitan's perquisites were again confirmed by Governor Mossel in 1752. 60 Ince Maulud, the second Kapitan Melayu (or third, if we include Abdul Nazul), was appointed in January 1724. He was born in Banjarmasin, but had been brought up in Makassar, and was about thirty-eight years old when he became Kapitan. He soon came into conflict with the VOC authorities, and his case has interesting implications. The immediate cause of Dutch dissatisfaction seemed simple: in 1726 some Buginese attacked two Europeans in the market, and a riot ensued. Ince Maulud was informed that two Dutchmen were being murdered, but he simply closed his door. When the Company legal official tried to call upon the Kapitan to mobilise Malay resistance to the Buginese, some twenty Malays blocked his entry to the house, and no help was forthcoming. The Malays simply stayed inside until the Buginese had left, avoiding any confrontation. The VOC authorities felt that Ince Maulud had failed in his duty to maintain order and support the Dutch. At the same time, they were also investigating his finances, as he was heavily in debt, and one of his creditors -'a Batavian native woman' -wanted to seize his assets, but these were proving difficult to locate. The Company authorities suggested he had defrauded his creditors, by giving at least eleven slaves away to the King of Bone. But Ince Maulud responded with simple answers to such accusations of bad faith. He claimed there had been no people in his house who could have helped the beleaguered Dutchmen, and that the slaves had not been given away, but had fled.
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Subsequent questioning, however, indicated that Ince Maulud found himself in a delicate political situation. Although he had been told that the ruler of Bone was planning an incident in the market to humiliate the Dutch, he had neglected to warn the authorities. When asked why, he replied that his information came from a mixed Malay-Moor, a follower of a Buginese nobleman, who was also in the service of the translator Gerrit Brugman. Consequently, Ince Maulud had presumed the Dutch were aware of the plot. 'Translators' such as Brugman were, after all, the main links between the VOC and local states or communities. 62 Ince Maulud was also asked why, when Brugman had given him the use of Company rice fields (no doubt as a perquisite of office), did he then give the produce to the King of Bone? He explained that the Buginese had come and taken the harvest. Finally, the Dutch inquired why he failed to pay his respects to the VOC authorities on the customary feast days. Because he was ashamed, he replied, as he had lost all his possessions.
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It is of course possible that Ince Maulud's excuses were genuine. But the pattern suggests another interpretation: that either willingly or unwillingly, Ince Maulud was acknowledging the authority of the Bugis ruler of Bone. Since the conquest the King of Bone had maintained a house close to Makassar, at Bontoalaq, and spent months there every year; this gave him every opportunity to expand his influence in the port-town's kampung. For example, Bone's rulers were able to demand services from the Wajorese in Makassar, undermining the authority of the head of that community, the matoa. The fact that, coincidentally, the Bone kings also bore by right a high title from the Bugis state of Wajo reinforced their claims, heightening tensions between matoa and court. 64 The temptation must have been great for them to seek similar influence over that other prominent Muslim commercial group, the Malays. It is clear from the line of questioning that this was the suspicion of Makassar's Dutch authorities. Ince Maulud did not survive long as Kapitan, being replaced in 1728. 65 Ince Maulud's successor, Ince Samba, hardly did any better. He was appointed in 1728 but dismissed by Governor Arrewijne in December 1733 on the grounds that he was addicted to opium. His replacement was the 'free Malay' Ince Bendak, 66 a descendant of Datuk Maharaja Lela, and hence of the highest birth. His daughter's marriage to the wealthy trader Ince Ali Asdullah was to have dramatic consequences (see below); it also secured his descendants' grip on the Malay community for over a century and a half.
The position of Kapitan Melayu had its privileges and obligations, as did those of the other community headmen. 67 Ince Cukka had received the right to collect fees for registering property, and one of his successors as Kapitan, Abdul Kadir (see below) complained in 1768 that a proposal to remove this right to levy fees on house sales would further reduce his 'sober income' . The percentage on the sale of the simple bamboo dwellings in Kampung Melayu did not amount to much, and Abdul Kadir was probably being disingenuous. The right to levy such fees was a minor aspect of his ability to profit from his position, as his responsibility for law and order and his access to men of influence made him a force in community life and commerce. There is no doubt that the officers enjoyed many perquisites (such as Ince Maulud's rice fields), and probably many semi-illicit fruits of power. The Wajorese matoa, in a similar role, benefited from considerable advantages in trade.
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If responsibility sometimes weighed heavily on the Kapitan, apparently being subject to his authority could also be onerous. In 1769 Ince Mursidin, requesting permission to retire after twenty years' service as lieutenant of the Malays, petitioned the VOC to free him and his family from the authority of the Kapitan Melayu, and to take him under direct Company rule. The authorities granted his request, seeing this as a due reward, so like the people of 'other free kampung,' he then fell under VOC jurisdiction, as exercised by the translator Brugman. But this did not mean that Ince Mursidin could ignore his communal obligations. He had still to contribute to the maintenance of the mosque, and the guard, and he was sternly admonished to continue to show respect to the Kapitan and his officers, just as the Kapitan would now respect his new status, and renounce all claims on him. 70 Ince Mursidin was one of the few Malay officers who did not come from Abdul Kadir's own family, which might have been a reason for his request.
One of the problems facing the Kapitans and other community headmen was the need to maintain the integrity of their group. Each leader strove to maximise his following. In the mideighteenth century, for example, the Wajorese matoa was continually struggling to prevent his followers from drifting out of Makassar's Kampung Wajo' into other kampung, such as Bandang, Buton, and Melayu. 71 The Malays' main competitor in communal boundary disputes seems to have been the Muslim Chinese community. No doubt there were other on-going processes of blending and crystallisation (witness, for example, the gradual disappearance of Mardijkers and Moors, or the tug-of-war over the Wajorese), but perhaps because both Chinese and Malay communities were living under direct Company protection, their tensions are the best documented. The theoretical rigidity of ethnic classifications, especially those imposed by the bureaucratic VOC, was at odds with the pragmatic opportunism and cultural flexibility typical of the settlement's social life.
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Many Chinese in seventeenth-and eighteenth-century Makassar were very much part of the town; a majority may well have been Muslim. Even many of the so-called 'junk' Chinese, who came from Amoy (Xiamen) to trade and stayed for six months in most years after 1740, had their own local families, and some of these merchants were Muslim. As Makassar's dominant trading communities (excluding the VOC), the Chinese and Malays were often locked in competition, but their activities were also in many ways complementary, so long-term partnerships developed. There were close ties -personal and commercial -between the two communities. This can be seen in genealogies.
The forefather of many prominent Malay families was Datuk Maharaja Lela, whose central role in seventeenth-century Makassar has been outlined above. The closeness between the two communities, with the concomitant blurring of boundaries, could also be problematic. The Makassar Chinese had their own version of their relationship with the Malays immediately after Speelman's victory. They claimed that at that time the Kapitan of the Chinese community, Ong Watko, had been given authority over all the peranakan Chinese and Malays. But the Malays had a powerful ally. The wife of Arung Palakka -the Company's Buginese partner and ruler of the dominant kingdom of Bone (1672-96) -interceded with the Dutch on their behalf. She argued that the Malays should have their own headman, and so Ince Cukka was appointed. 77 But it was specified that Chinese Muslims were to remain under the Kapitan China. This was later to be a source of conflict.
In 1750 the Kapitan China complained that, in violation of established rights and custom, the contentious Kapitan Melayu 'Ince Banjar' was claiming authority over 'Chinese' , and emotions ran so high that a 'bloody fight' was narrowly avoided. The Malay Kapitan, Abdul Kadir (perhaps his nickname was Ince Banjar?), counter-attacked with the statement that the Chinese were asserting The Kapitan's control over people was necessary to generate income and preserve status, and the importance attached to these nineteen households reminds us again of how small these communities were. The Wajorese drifted out of their Kampung Wajo' to live in other areas of the town, and resisted attempts to force them to return. As inhabitants of Kampung Melayu, they were exempt from services and enjoyed more freedom than they would have if they returned to their own kampung and the authority of their matoa. 79 There is a hint in the documents that there was a comparable financial element involved in Chinese resistance to Malay authority. The Chinese Kapitan, when referring to the rights of the peranakan Chinese, only specifically mentioned one: that when a peranakan died intestate and without relatives, his estate, according to Batavia practice, was to be taken over and administered by the Dutch orphan chamber (weeskamer). 80 The chamber would then be responsible for investing the capital, and the orphans would receive their inheritance, including any profits, on reaching their majority. This was probably more advantageous than alternatives which might be applied should the peranakan Chinese fall under the Kapitan Melayu, and recalls the Malays' emphasis on their own exemption from Makassarese customary law in their agreement of 1561. Residence, allegiance and ethnic classification determined legal status, and that could have significant economic as well as social consequences.
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As always, there were some who seized the opportunities offered by a new regime, and one particular family arose to dominate the Malay community from the mid-eighteenth to the midnineteenth century. The decisive figure was Ince Ali Asdullah, whose title of Datuk Pabean reflects the source of the family's sustained wealth: his ability to purchase from the Dutch the monopoly right to levy import and export duties. His control of the lucrative customs farm during the 1770s and 1780s laid the foundations for his family's success. Ince Ali Asdullah's descendants provided the Kapitan Melayu from the 1730s till the 1880s. His own Arab-Malay origin, reinforced by eighteenth-century marriages into families of Sayids (descendants of the Prophet), helped reinforce his family's hold on the prestigious position of Imam of the Malay mosque built and endowed by Ince Ali Asdullah and his brother (see below).
Ince Ali Asdullah's forebears were characteristically peripatetic. His grandfather, Datuk Abdul Mannan Amir, went from Bima to Sinjai on south Sulawesi, where he married a daughter of the Arung Bulo-Bulo. He took his wife to live in the Kampung Melayu in Makassar. There he had a son, called Ince Abdul Rachman, who was adopted by a Sayid, Achmad Bochari. When Datuk Abdul Mannan Amir returned to Bima (where he died), Sayid Achmad Bochari gave Ince Abdul Rachman into the hands of the Raja of Tallo' , Sultan Syafiuddin, who married him to his granddaughter. The sultan also gave him the lordship over all of the small islands from the Spermonde Archipelago opposite Makassar which belonged to Tallo' and began with Sa-(Sabutung, Satando, Sanga-sanga, Salemo, Sagara, Sabangka, Sarappo etc. This island of Sabutung had been a Malay place of refuge in the final phase of the war against the Dutch-Bugis alliance. Ince Abdul Rachman had five sons, including Abdul Kadir and the younger Ali Asdullah, who were brought up in simple circumstances, but studied the Koran and learnt to read, write and calculate. Their livelihood came from their islands -they were traders, or sailors, or perahubuilders, or they took sea products such as tortoiseshell, agar-agar (seaweed) or trepang (seacucumbers) to the town of Makassar, where they sold them to Chinese traders. It is probable that they also maintained commercial relationships with the Bajo, as the Spermonde Archipelago was also frequented by these 'sea-nomads' , who were experts in the exploitation of marine resources. This period, the 1730s, was a profitable time for Makassar, when the trade in sea products with China was transforming the economy. 81 This growing source of wealth must have strengthened those groups who were able to capitalise on the new opportunities. The resulting social mobility is reflected in the eventual admission of Datuk Sabutung's descendants into Makassar's Malay elite.
The Kapitan Melayu of the time, Ince Bendak, as we have seen, was descended from Datuk Maharaja Lela, and a man of high status and wealth. He was acquainted with a Chinese Muslim merchant called Musalaf, who was also Datuk Sabutung's friend. All three were no doubt engaged in commerce. While visiting Datuk Sabutung, Musalaf 's eye fell on Ali Asdullah, who was by then trading regularly with Kalimantan (Pegatan/Pasir and Kutei) and Java (Batavia). Musalaf asked why the young man was unmarried, and suggested that a suitable candidate would be the Kapitan's daughter. Datuk Sabutung replied that the difference in rank between his family and that of Ince Bendak was like that between the earth and the sky, and Musalaf said no more, but prayed that God would unite the pair. Two months later, one of the authorities from Makassar, a Dutch Tuan Besar (probably the governor) stayed on Sabutung for a couple of days, at the same time that Musalaf was also visiting. When the Tuan asked why Ali Asdullah was unmarried, Musalaf said that only Puteri Ratna Kasian, the daughter of the Kapitan, would be a suitable match. The Tuan Besar asked Datuk Sabutung if this was so. Once again, Datuk Sabutung emphasised the difference in rank and wealth, stating that he himself was poor and of low birth. The Tuan Besar stood up, thumped the table with his hand, and said he personally would arrange the marriage; Datuk Sabutung need only wait, and before the next east monsoon he would be called to Makassar.
The Tuan Besar was as good as his word. Datuk Sabutung was summoned to Makassar, met by the Kapitan Ince Bendak, and taken to the palace of the Tuan Besar, where the leaders of the Malay community and other nations waited. The Tuan Besar told Ince Bendak that he wished to see a marriage between the Kapitan's daughter and Ince Ali Asdullah to which the Kapitan replied, 'Whatever my lord wants, I will accept willingly' . The Tuan Besar produced paper and pen, and the elders of Kampung Melayu all witnessed the engagement.
In fact, Kapitan Ince Bendak was far from happy, but on attempting to withdraw from the arrangement he was reminded by the Malay leaders of his commitment, so he had to let the wedding proceed. However, he was tormented by regrets. On the day that Ince Ali Asdullah arrived to claim his bride, with full customary pomp, her father was nowhere to be seen. A search revealed his body hanging from the rafters. This must have been in 1739, as a new Kapitan was appointed in August of that year. 82 The wedding feast became a funeral, and the family of the groom, instead of sitting facing their new relatives, was set apart, and a fight followed. When Ince Ali Asdullah realised that Puteri Ratna Kasian's entire family opposed the match, he withdrew to Sabutung, and then left again on his trading voyages to Kalimantan, Java and beyond. After two years wandering he returned with rich profits and jewels, but thinking only of his unclaimed wife at Makassar. Some time later his bride's family realised that they should not keep the two apart, and sent someone to tell Ince Ali Asdullah to collect Puteri Ratna Kasian and take her to Sabutung. This he did, and she came, bringing with her only the clothes she was wearing.
Ince Ali Asdullah became a man of great wealth, and gradually his family-in-law became reconciled; one by one they came to Sabutung, and he was accepted. His reputation grew further, until the Malay community asked him to follow in the footsteps of his father-in-law as Kapitan, replacing Ince Jamaluddin, who had succeeded Ince Bendak. But Ince Ali Asdullah refused, as he preferred to sail and trade throughout the archipelago. Also, he had his eye on a more lucrative proposition: the monopoly on in-and outgoing duties of the port of Makassar. He succeeded in holding this office for years, and so was known as Datuk Pabean, or Datuk Syahbandar.
83
Just as the Kapitans were the political link between the VOC and the Asian communities, of which the Dutch had very limited knowledge, so were the pachters or tax-farmers the instrument for tapping profits from those sectors of the local economy claimed by the Company. 84 The Dutch wished to take advantage of any possibility of making money, but it was often more practical for them to sell exploitation rights, rather than attempt to penetrate and manage local networks. The oldest recorded farm in Makassar, dating from 1699,was the monopoly on the sale of alcohol (which included gambling, opium and the keeping of taverns); this was usually held by a retired Company soldier. 85 But Batavia was dissatisfied with the low level of income generated; after a scandal the system of farms was extended, and from 1745 the right to collect duties on incoming and outgoing vessels and their cargoes was auctioned. Previously, this had probably been controlled by the harbourmaster, a VOC official. 86 A few years later a tax-farm was also introduced for markets. Initially, farms were usually controlled by the Kapitan China, and it is highly probable that they were a formalisation of existing rights and a compensation for investment, as well as an attempt to increase town revenue. Later, in the mid-1750s, more farms were added. The farmers' identities reflect relative access to economic resources. The alcohol monopoly was in European hands until the 1770s, when they were replaced by Chinese; the gambling, slaughter and Chinese head-tax collecting rights were all Chinese-controlled (except for one year when a mestizo was collecting the tax). The monopoly on running the town's markets was much more open, falling to Chinese, Malays and mestizos. But far and away the most valuable farm was that of the customs duties. For a quarter of a century this was a bone of contention in the fierce struggle waged by Ince Ali Asdullah and his elder brother, Abdul Kadir, the Kapitan Melayu, against Makassar's Chinese elite.
During this period, the annual amount paid for the farm rose from around 12,000 to over 20,000 -rds considerable sums when one considers that a bamboo house and block of land sold for about 50 rds and a good slave for 30. The real value of the farms -their profitability -is hard to ascertain, given the tendency of aspiring farmers to form cartels, fix the bidding and undervalue, on the one hand, as opposed to the desire to win and gain social prestige on the other. Trade is always a risky business, and wars or policy changes -in the region, Batavia or China -could reduce commerce to such a degree that the farmer lost heavily.
87 But Ince Ali Asdullah's grip on the customs monopoly was impressive. His first sally, in 1766, gained him the farm for one year only, at a cost of 8,244 rds, considerably less than the previous Chinese had paid (12,000). But the trade between Makassar and China was both crucial and complex, and in his calculations as to the profitability of the farm he had banked on collecting duty on imports from China. But that year no junk came directly to Makassar from Amoy, so commodities from China arrived via Batavia.
Ince Ali Asdullah had not realised -he said -that Chinese tobacco imported from Batavia was exempt from duty, and tried to collect his percentage. He appealed to the harbourmaster but was told he could levy no claims on the cargo. Makassar's peranakan Chinese were also up in arms, claiming that the marginal existence of their small community would be further undermined if double taxation was allowed, with duties paid first in Batavia and then again in Makassar. The VOC refused Ince Ali Asdullah's request for restitution of part of his payment. 88 It could be that he was able to take the farm for such a relatively low amount because his Chinese competitors had inside information on the junk's non-arrival in Makassar. But their lack of interest in 1766 may have backfired, as Ince Ali Asdullah was now committed to gaining control of the farm.
He lost the customs monopoly the following year, to a Chinese prepared to pay 13,000, but then his older brother, Kapitan Melayu Abdul Kadir took over, for 14,376. The farm then passed to Ince Ali Asdullah for three years, before a Chinese recaptured it for over 17,000 rds. Ince Ali Asdullah retook the monopoly and subsequently held it for fourteen years, from 1776 to 1789, on a fixed annual tariff of 18,000 rds. In 1781 Ince Ali Asdullah had further problems with Chinese complaints; he was accused of overcharging, and he himself had noted that differences of opinion on the prices of opium, Chinese tobacco and cotton led to conflict. However, inspection of his books (to the accuracy of which he swore every year on the Koran), and the support of the previous Chinese farmer, showed that he was keeping to the farm conditions, and he retained his position.
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This continuity was ensured by a contract with the Company, removing the custom's farm allocation from competitive bidding. Batavia was not happy with this, fearing lost income, but the Makassar authorities defended it on the grounds that stability and peace was ensured because of Ince Ali Asdullah's close connections to the native courts. This reversed the opinion expressed earlier, in 1766, that Chinese were preferable to Malays as pachters. 90 Then the issue had been the need to maintain a smooth relationship with the Chinese traders handling imports from China, but by 1784 the emphasis had switched to avoiding problems with the Sulawesian rulers, particularly expansionist Bone.
This shift probably reflected an awareness on the Dutch side of their vulnerability, as the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-84) had caused a visible collapse in VOC shipping and prestige. 91 The governor of Makassar explained that in principle he would prefer to auction the farm, but 'the present farmer (HS Ince Ali Asdullah) is now accustomed to dealing with all the native kings and other important men, particularly with the king of Bone, and if a Chinese or someone else should come in, then daily squabbles could be expected' . 92 the inevitable fluctuations of trade. The fact that Ince Ali Asdullah was able to hold this position for so long is a tribute to his skills and influence. While he was by the far the most important, Ince Ali Asdullah was not the only tax-farmer from the Malay community, although it is striking that most of the other farmers were also from his family. In 1766, the same year that Ince Ali Asdullah obtained the customs farm, his older brother Ince Abdul Kadir purchased the market farm for 197 rds, but it reverted to Chinese control the following year. However, in 1769 Ince Ali Asdullah's son, the Letnan Melayu Ince Suleiman, paid 475 rds to obtain the farm, and held it for that year and also for 1776, 1782, 1784, 1785, 1788-90. While his main competitors were Chinese, a couple of other Malays did run the markets for a year at a time. A tendency towards family continuity in holding high community office could also be observed among Makassar's Wajorese matoa.
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This financial pre-eminence of Ince Ali Asdullah's family brought with it attendant obligations. Around 1756 (A.H. 1117) he and his brother Abdul Kadir built a new mosque for the community, close to the old one which had been built by 'Datuk Punggawa' in the late sixteenth century, soon after the agreement between the Malays and the ruler Karaeng Tunapilangga. 94 As we have seen, the earlier Kapitan Ince Cukka had also built a mosque, in 1705 (1117 A.H.). 95 The late eighteenth-century mosque, later known as the Mesjid Makmur, was supported by a number of charitable endowments (wakaf). Ince Ali Asdullah entrusted this mosque to his posterity, the future Kapitans, Letnans and Imams of the Makassar Malays. Only they could wield legitimate authority over it. Access to leadership of the community was further restricted to those descendants who were anak kosomah, having Malays as both mother and father. Anak gundik, men with a non-Malay parent, were disqualified. 96 This last stipulation seems to have proved impracticable. 97 Such arrangements translated the wealth gained through the Dutch monopolies into legitimate social pre-eminence, and ensured the family's status.
The importance of tax-farming in the history of the Southeast Asian Chinese has received considerable and well-deserved attention. The most famous and lucrative, the opium farms, not only provided an important means of investing and accumulating capital, but were also closely linked to the consolidation of political and economic networks. Wealthy tax-farmers had access to colonial officials; close ties and influence with indigenous elites and networks of subordinate traders and agents were also essential. 98 While a customs farm did not require the same elaborate distribution network, it did need authority, knowledge and sound judgement. In the case of Ince Ali Asdullah, it seems to have offered comparable opportunities for commercial consolidation and social mobility. The customs farm was undoubtedly only one source of Ince Ali Asdulah's wealth. The foundations of his fortune lay in his trading; it was the money earned on his journeys to Kalimantan and Java which enabled him to pay for the farm -and to win the support of powerful Dutch and Chinese allies for his ambitious wedding.
Although Dutch descriptions of Malay trade are few and far between in the later eighteenth century, some general trends can be identified through analysis of the harbourmaster's registers.
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The mid-century, including the 1770s, showed little development, although Malay skippers probably remained strong in their traditional commodities of rice and slaves. Their main imports into Makassar were sea products, coconut oil and rice, while marine produce and cloth dominated exports. They were probably also bringing slaves into South Sulawesi. By the 1780s they had consolidated their decades-long domination of coconut oil imports, most of which came in from Ende on Flores, which was a centre of Sulawesian settlement and one of the archipelago's main slave markets. The Malays were shipping in almost 400 slaves a year, mainly from Ende. They were still importing rice, raw cotton and Indian textiles. Their main exports were coins (rijksdaalders), Chinese earthenware, Chinese linen and Indian cloth. As was to be expected, given their commodities, Nusa Tenggara (the Lesser Sundas) was the favoured trading partner of Makassar's Malays. It is estimated that while the share of trade held by other Indonesian groups and locally born Europeans was declining in the face of the growing Chinese role in commerce, the Malays not only managed to hold their own, but showed a slight strengthening. 100 Their share in the volume of shipping grew from 2 per cent in the 1720s through 11 per cent in the 1760s, to 15 per cent in the 1780s. 101 Another Company source, the lists of merchants who bought textiles from the VOC shop, offers information through negation. While mestizo traders predominated, and Chinese were strongly represented among the purchasers -and there was even the occasional Makassarese -the absence of Malays shows that they obtained their trade textiles through other sources. 106 The Malays were similarly peripheral in other VOC institutions. In contrast to the Chinese and even -though to a lesser extent -the Buginese and the Makassarese, they very seldom, if ever, borrowed money from the orphan chamber or deaconate, Dutch charitable institutions which were an important source of credit. They were, however, prominent borrowers from a private mestizo money-lender who offered smaller loans, so it could be that Malays were just not involved in the more substantial European credit market.
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Malays are also absent from another source of social information; the urban tax rolls. While VOC officials, mestizos, burghers, Chinese and 'free natives' had to pay their 5 per cent on house and ship sales, no Malays were subject to these taxes. Even when incidental information, such as the 1742 extra levy on Vlaardingen residents to pay for lamp-oil, shows five 'Ince' residents, 108 we can not be sure that these were Malay: they could well be peranakan Chinese. This apparent marginalisation of the Malays is, however, a product of community-based taxation practice. They paid their dues to the Kapitan Melayu, who obviously had greater fiscal power over his subjects than the Kapitan China did over his. There was one arena, however, where the Malays were subject to the Company, and that was the law. If arbitration and judgement within their community proved impossible or unacceptable, plaintiffs could apply to Makassar's Council of Justice. Many Malays were involved in disputes over trade or loans; Ince Ali Asdullah himself applied to the court in 1787 to recover a debt of 90 rds from the Chinese Andiko. 109 In significant criminal cases, such as murder, the Council would also act.
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Conclusion
Our account of the Makassar Malays requires us to consider two linked historiographical issues. The first is primarily a question of assessing their changing role in town and trade, given the dramatic transformation of the region after the Dutch conquest. The second, more recalcitrant, need is to consider the implications of ethnic categorisation, both for the social and political processes of the society itself and for our perceptions and analyses.
When writing of Speelman's invitation to the Malays to return to Makassar after the conquest, a contemporary Malay source, rather uncharacteristically, offers a commentary: 'Dalam hal ini ada kemungkinan besar orang2 Melayu dianggap dapat menjadi perantara yang netral antara VOC dan Raja Goa dan dapat menstabilkan keadaan' (In this case it is very probable that the Malays were considered as neutral mediators between the VOC and the King of Goa, and that they could stabilise the situation). 111 The very language is revealing, and not just because of the Anglicisms. 'Neutrality' and 'stability' would probably have fallen far short of the aims of victorious Bone, bent upon further expansion of its influence, and offered very cold comfort to the shattered Makassarese trying to recover from the devastation visited upon them. But these terms do reflect the priorities of the Dutch in 1670, who wanted an end to war, and clear political and commercial hegemony. Pragmatic traders of all communities no doubt also looked forward to peace, although few would have welcomed the crushing economic restrictions which accompanied it.
In retrospect, the role of neutral mediator seems to have served the Makassar Malays well, and the comment quoted above reflects that perception. This is rooted not only in the trends of the 1700s, but also in those of the subsequent nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the Makassar Malays were prominent in (post-) colonial administration, education and law. But this perception also resonates with images from earlier times, when the Malays were brokers between the wider Islamic world and the kingdoms of South Sulawesi. A similar cosmopolitan breadth of vision might be detected in their openness to all members of the ummat, the brotherhood of Islam. Arab sayid and Chinese imams appear in their genealogies, as do Buginese and Makassarese.
Writing of the founders of Melaka, Oliver Wolters praised their greatness. They were 'masters of political intelligence, quick to exploit changes in their environment' , shrewd in their choice of alliances, and effective in their mobilisation of 'folk identity, shaped by memories of the past' . 112 The same could be said of the Makassarese Malays, mutatis mutandis. Being Malay was to possess a cultural and social passport, providing potential access to the commerce of the diaspora networks and the political advantages of a respected lineage. The combination of Malayness with more locally grounded identities offered the opportunity to capitalise upon these wider linkages, without abandoning more narrowly focused solidarities.
Although the VOC's repressive policies dismantled the extended trading system in which the Malays had played so central a role, within a few decades they had re-oriented themselves. Traders successfully re-deployed to new routes, and the economic and social institutions of the VOC townthe farms and the Kapitan system -were effectively manipulated. The Malay community became a mainstay of Dutch rule, and a central element in Makassar's (re)emerging urban society. In that sense, they were indeed 'neutral mediators' who helped 'stabilise' the situation. But this stability was maintained by constant negotiation. Ethnic boundaries and relative status in the colonial hierarchy were contested, and involvement with the Dutch did not necessarily mean rejection of local rulers. Malay resilience can not be read as simple continuity. Tunipalangga, Speelman and the Malay Kapitans Ince Maulud and Abdul Kadir all confronted the political dilemmas raised by the ambiguity of 'the Malay' . Malays might be Minangkabau or Moor, from Johor, Patani or Banjarmasin. These specific origins could be subsumed into Malayness, the very essence of which was its supra-local character.
Ethnic labels reify. This tendency is reinforced when we couple them to the word 'community' , with connotations of solidarity and harmony. It is then all too easy to presuppose the existence of an enduring group, characterised by a common culture and a cohesive social structure. In Makassar, the various kampung -Ternate, Banda, Butung, China, Melayu, Belanda -and the 'nations' under their headmen -Mayor Melayu, Kapitan China, Matoa Wajo -seem to form a stable system. But, as we have seen, category boundaries are problematic. The Wajorese tended to dissolve into their neighbours, peranakan flexibility blurred boundaries, few Butonese lived in Kampung Buton, and even the thriving Malay 'community' could be deconstructed into clusters of heterogeneous compounds. Assumptions of uniformity deny the protean character of constituent elementsfactions, families or even specific men or women. The presumed whole overrides the agency of the part. The reverse can also happen, when personal or specific actions are seen as exemplifying a communal reality.
Seventeenth-and eighteenth-century Dutchmen write of 'Malays' or 'the Buginese' as being competitive traders. But failure to differentiate within the ethnic category can mean that the activities of the few are seen as typical of the whole. No-one can fail to be impressed by the number of slaves Ince Patani took from Buton in 1683. But we do not know if this voyage, recorded by chance, was a random example of a wider Malay slave trade, transferring thousands of victims from the eastern to the western archipelago. Or was this transaction recorded precisely because it was noteworthy? These three or four ships might have taken the bulk of the year's exports, the slaves having been gradually accumulated at a central market, awaiting the exceptional Ince Patani.
It is very difficult to pin down the social reality behind the labels. Anyone from the west was 'Javanese' in sixteenth-century Makassar, just as later refugees from South Sulawesi tended to become 'Buginese' , whatever their origins. In 1561 King Tunapilangga was uncertain who was Malay. 'Moors' and 'Mardijkers' , once so numerous, disappeared from the Makassar census in the early eighteenth century, 113 while Speelman's notes underline the persisting diversity, and importance, of local origins and family blood-lines within the Malay category. Ince Amin, himself a 'Malay of Makassarese descent' , generally uses the term peranakan to identify the Malays fighting alongside Goa, and his translator, Skinner, glosses peranakan as 'the Malay community' , but the category is ambiguous. 114 The inhabitants of eighteenth-century Makassar also had problems in reconciling the unruly realities of their social life, with an increasingly rigid classification. 115 If we are to do justice to both the 'essential' and 'constructed' dimensions of ethnicity, we need to acknowledge the interaction between the social capital (trust, norms, networks) that is transmitted and adapted from generation to generation, and the institutions and rules which channel access to resources. Being 'Malay' was an important element in both self-definition and ascribed status, associated with a supra-local or transcendent identity rooted in the cultural and commercial traditions of Melaka and Islam. This was true in Goan Makassar, and also under the Dutch. In the pre-conquest polity, where commerce was central and Islam flush with noble patronage and military success, Melaka refugees and Malay merchants were welcomed, and wealthy newcomers married into leading local families. The VOC, however, was hostile to the Malay heritage of open seas and Muslim knowledge, and so it closed doors. Trade routes were blocked, Islam relegated to the darker fringes of native society, and a more inflexible administrative grid imposed.
The result, for the Malays, was a process of localisation. Their role was more restricted, and their attention increasingly focused on Makassar itself. They had lost those previous essential advantages in trade and religion which had both sustained, and been supported by, their transcendent identity. The Dutch East India Company based social control and access to resources on ethnic categories, and the Malays mobilised effectively, using the new institutions to defend and   :   , . - 419
